American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic
Journals

Scholarship & Research

2003

Achieving a Final Status Settlement for Kosovo
Paul Williams
R Hitchner
Janusz Bugajski

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev
Part of the International Law Commons

Achieving a
Final Status Settlement
for Kosovo

Authors
Janusz Bugajski
R. Bruce Hitchner
Paul Williams

Sponsors
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Dayton Peace Accords Project
National Albanian American Council
Public International Law and Policy Group

April 2003

About CSIS
For four decades, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has been
dedicated to providing world leaders with strategic insights on—and policy solutions to—
current and emerging global issues.
CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, former U.S. deputy secretary of defense. It is guided by a
board of trustees chaired by former U.S. senator Sam Nunn and consisting of prominent
individuals from both the public and private sectors.
The CSIS staff of 190 researchers and support staff focus primarily on three subject
areas. First, CSIS addresses the full spectrum of new challenges to national and international
security. Second, it maintains resident experts on all of the world’s major geographical
regions. Third, it is committed to helping to develop new methods of governance for the
global age; to this end, CSIS has programs on technology and public policy, international
trade and finance, and energy.
Headquartered in Washington, D.C., CSIS is private, bipartisan, and tax-exempt. CSIS
does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be
understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2003 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
All rights reserved.

Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Phone: (202) 775-3150
Fax: (202) 466-4739
E-mail: books@csis.org
Web site: http://www.csis.org/

Contents
1. Purpose of this Report .............................................................................1
2. Urgent Need for Final Status Planning....................................................2
3. Final Status and U.S. National Security Interests....................................3
4. The Case for an Independent Kosovo......................................................4
5. Status with Standards: A Roadmap to Final Status Negotiations ............6
6. Final Status Negotiations.........................................................................11
Appendix 1: UNSC 1244 Not a Barrier to Resolution of Final Status..........15
Appendix 2: The Need for Kosovar Unity ....................................................17

iii

Achieving a Final Status
Settlement for Kosovo
Janusz Bugajski, R. Bruce Hitchner, and Paul Williams

1. Purpose of this Report
On November 19, 2002, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
the National Albanian American Council, and the Dayton Peace Accords Project
held a one-day conference in Washington, D.C., at CSIS, entitled “The Future of
Kosovo.” The conference was attended by U.S. policymakers, congressional
representatives, regional specialists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
business leaders, journalists, as well as key activists and analysts from Kosovo.
The vital question of Kosovo’s emerging status was discussed openly with a view
to producing a subsequent report offering concrete recommendations to the U.S.
administration, U.S. legislators, and major international organizations on the
question of Kosovo’s future status.
A second meeting, sponsored by the Dayton Peace Accords Project and the
Public International Law and Policy Group, and attended by representatives of the
National Albanian American Council and the Project on Ethnic Relations (PER),1
was held at the Center for Human Values at Princeton University on March 14,
2003, to review a preliminary draft of this report.
This report presents a rationale and roadmap for a final status agreement
leading to a fully sovereign and independent Kosovo. The report does not
represent the views of all the participants in the meetings noted above.
The authors wish to thank Minh-Thu D. Pham, Nils M. Mueller, Eleonora
Ibrani, Margaret Dobrydnio, and Ilona Teleki for their assistance in preparing this
report, and John and Stacey MacDonald for their support of this endeavor.

1

PER does not take a position on the final status of Kosovo.

1
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2. Urgent Need for Final Status Planning
Continuing international ambiguity and delay over the final status of Kosovo is
increasingly untenable. Confusion and obfuscation over whether the territory
becomes a long-term United Nations (UN) or European Union (EU) protectorate,
is unilaterally handed over to Belgrade’s control, or is finally launched on a
trajectory for statehood erodes the effectiveness of the UN Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), fuels the misplaced hopes for some in Serbia that all or part of Kosovo
will again come under the authority of Belgrade, postpones stability in Southeast
Europe, and most disturbingly, contributes to increased tensions, political and
economic stagnation, and an unhealthy culture of dependence among Kosovo’s
ambitious, youthful, and growing population.
The international community has argued that Kosovo’s society and
institutions must demonstrate that they are ready to govern responsibly before
discussions on final status can begin. However, such a position, nourished by the
ambivalence over status in UN Resolution 1244, turns the problem on it head. It is
not so much up to the Kosovars to prove their ability to govern as much as it is up
to the international community to make the case for why the development of
functioning institutions in Kosovo precludes the determination of the territory’s
final status or why the nature of that status should remain in question.
Three and a half years after NATO took control of the territory from Slobodan
Milosevic’s forces, the foundations of credible self-governing institutions in
Kosovo are already in place. Indeed, there are numerous sovereign states around
the globe that are arguably less politically and institutionally developed than
Kosovo with or without the presence of UNMIK.
The continued ambivalence over Kosovo’s status and the virtually
unchallenged authority of UNMIK raise the specter of a new form of colonialism,
administered and shaped by a predominantly West European cadre of officials.
This situation promotes both political and social instability and economic stasis in
Kosovo.
The importance of moving to final status rapidly is also in Serbia’s interest.
As the late Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic observed, “We cannot define
the statehood of Serbia, until we know what the status of Kosovo-Metohija is….
The world has to realize that after two years, Serbian Democrats, and I as
representative of the Serbian government…still cannot say what our state is.”
Thus, addressing Kosovo’s status will help not only Kosovo, but will also help
Serbia to define its own statehood. Indeed, the resolution of Kosovo’s status and
the certainty of the region’s future will allow the EU to move away from the
continual need to stabilize the region and instead launch a new agenda in
Southeast Europe.
In sum, there can be no certainty of stability and cooperation in the southern
Balkans as long as Kosovo’s future remains unclear.
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3. Final Status and U.S. National Security Interests
In his letter of September 17, 2002, announcing the new National Security
Strategy of the United States, President George W. Bush stated that:
The United States will actively work to bring the hope of democracy,
development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.
The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like
Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong
states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers.
Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states
vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders. The
United States will stand by any nation determined to build a better future
by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people.
The Balkans clearly fit into this important global objective of U.S. national
security policy, and the region contains three categories of states that can assist
Washington in its broader security mission: loyal allies (Bulgaria, Romania, and
Albania), aspiring allies (Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina), and one
future ally (Serbia and Montenegro). To become full allies of the United States,
each of the above-mentioned states and aspiring states must continue to build
strong democratic institutions and achieve, in the case of aspiring states and future
allies, clearly defined statehood.
There are three compelling security reasons for why the United States should
continue to stay engaged in the region and pursue the completion of its security
project in Southeastern Europe, which includes the settlement of Kosovo’s final
status:
!

First, Balkan security is not only important for NATO’s credibility, but
above all for America’s credibility and global strategy. Incomplete or
mismanaged postwar missions in the region, as well as in Afghanistan,
may encourage extremists in other trouble spots to push their agendas.
Furthermore, finishing the job adequately in Kosovo will lend credibility
to possible U.S. efforts to build a postwar Iraq. Failure to do so may send
the message to extremists that they can wait out the initial U.S. or allied
military intervention until commitment wanes and priorities and resources
are diverted elsewhere.

!

Second, Southeast Europe must be consolidated as a “terrorist free zone,”
and most countries in the region will cooperate in this endeavor
particularly if they see a pronounced U.S. engagement. In practice,
preventing the penetration of international terrorist groups means
promoting and ensuring democracy, self-determination, the rule of law,
minority rights, regional cooperation, and economic development, while
combating criminal networks active across the region. Afghanistan serves
as a poignant example of how political neglect and the insufficient
commitment of resources can engender renewed conflict. A final status
settlement in Kosovo would enhance the prospects of making Southeast
Europe a “terrorist free zone” by decreasing the trafficking of drugs, sex
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workers, and migrants from the East into Western Europe by criminal
networks.
!

Third, the United States has strong allies and aspiring allies in the Balkans,
and they are eager to support Washington in any future challenges to
transatlantic security. The United States must not neglect the national and
regional security interests of these emerging partners at the risk of losing
much of its influence as they gradually move closer to Brussels.

4. The Case for an Independent Kosovo
Moving toward final status negotiations cannot be accomplished without a clear
vision of what that status will be. In our view, the only viable option now on the
table is statehood for Kosovo.
A return to provincial status for Kosovo under Belgrade’s authority cannot be
seriously contemplated, as it would almost certainly lead to armed resistance. The
creation of a tripartite union with Serbia and Montenegro is likewise a political
chimera, as even the current union between these two states is unlikely to survive.
The only alternative to full-scale independence is the partition of Kosovo,
along the model of the now-failed Cyprus plan. To that end, the late Serbian
prime minister Djindjic and leaders of the Serbian community in Kosovo have
proposed that “Kosovo should be separated into the Serb and Albanian parts”
(i.e., a federal arrangement for an independent Kosovo with an autonomous Serb
entity). While protecting the rights of the Serb minority is a top priority, the
creation of a Serb entity that is linked to Belgrade would undermine the statebuilding process, and as the lessons of Bosnia demonstrate, a weak federal
structure with strong entity governments is an ineffective model for building the
national institutions necessary for implementing the rule of law, fostering
economic development, and encouraging ethnic reconciliation. Djindjic’s
proposal has been rightly rejected by Reno Harnish, the chief of the U.S. Office in
Pristina who observed, “All the proposals made by the Serbian prime minister,
starting from the request to return the Serbian forces in Kosovo, insisting for the
early solution of Kosovo status, as well as the last proposal for separation and
federalization of Kosovo, are nothing else but attempts for the creation of monoethnic regions and new separations in the Balkans.” The partition of Kosovo
could set a much more dangerous precedent among all neighboring countries than
the acceptance of an independent Kosovo within existing borders.
The merits of independence go well beyond the reductionist argument that
statehood is the best of a bad set of options. Of all the options, only independence
offers the prospect of a promising future for Kosovo and its neighbors. The case
for independence can be elaborated on the basis of political, economic, and
regional security considerations.

Janusz Bugajski, R. Bruce Hitchner, Paul Williams
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Political
!

A freely elected self-government will gain greater legitimacy as a
sovereign organ rather than as a simple tool in the hands of international
players, primarily the United Nations. Its authority and accountability to
the electorate will be enhanced through the successful completion of the
process leading to statehood. This will also undercut attempts to subvert or
circumvent the legitimate Kosovar authorities by nondemocratic and
organized criminal elements favoring a weak or uncertain state that allows
for their illicit operations, not only in Kosovo, but also across the border in
Macedonia.

!

An international commitment to statehood would lessen the likelihood of a
social explosion in Kosovo provoked by painful economic conditions.
Public morale and discipline will also increase with the realization that
independence, which is overwhelmingly favored by the majority of the
population in Kosovo, is achievable, imminent, durable, and vital to
preserve.

!

The creation of an independent Kosovar government, parliament, and
judicial and other institutions is the only way to develop a law-abiding
society and an inclusive democracy in which all citizens, regardless of
ethnicity, are granted the full array of human and civil rights, including the
right to return of all legitimate Serb refugees to their homes. Most
importantly, an independent government will be in a position to set social,
economic, and institutional priorities and draft legislation—actions now
almost entirely in the hands of UNMIK and other international
organizations.

Economic
!

There is little prospect for economic development until Kosovo is
independent and self-governing, as any other status solution would lead to
growing instability. Only responsible and empowered public institutions in
an independent Kosovo will set the political priorities and invest in the
infrastructure and services that will reduce the costs of production for
private entrepreneurs and spur economic growth. Moreover, few, if any,
foreign investors are likely to venture into a territory whose status remains
unclear and whose future is ambiguous.

Regional Security
!

Only statehood for Kosovo would ensure a more durable regional security
in the Balkans—one that is not based principally on the presence of
outside forces. With the development of an internal police force and a
credible Kosovar military contingent, threats can be diminished and
deterred, and contributions can be made to the international struggle
against organized terrorism and criminality. Washington can then pursue a
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concrete timetable for a troop withdrawal, while NATO as a whole
continues to guarantee the security of the new state from external threats.
Local and European initiatives in the Balkans will also have greater
chances of success, as suspicions over the ultimate motives of neighbors
will continue to evaporate. Resources pumped into the region could then
have a more practical and genuinely international dimension with lessened
interference by foreign middlemen.
!

The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), the EU’s main program
for encouraging reform in the Balkans, requires participants to be, at a
minimum, functioning sovereign states. As other Balkan states make
progress towards the eventual goals of European integration, Kosovo is
unable to participate because of its status as international protectorate.
Only an independent Kosovo, not represented by UNMIK, can begin the
essential process of European integration.

!

Maintaining the de facto integrity of Kosovo will send a strong signal to
extremists and ethnic agitators in Bosnia and Macedonia that partition is
not an attainable goal. Dividing Kosovo along ethnic lines would only
serve to encourage destabilizing elements throughout the region.

Finally, fears have been raised that independence for Kosovo will lead to
further disintegration in the region. It has been asserted, for example, that
independence for Kosovo would open the door for the Republika Sprska (RS) to
secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and open the door for other ethnic groups
within Serbia and other countries to demand territorial separation. These fears are
misplaced. The case for separating the RS from Bosnia is frivolous, as it is an
artificial entity created by ethnic cleansing and therefore undeserving of further
status considerations. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the RS or any
other ethnic group could make claims to independence based on the criteria laid
out by the Badinter Commission. Ultimately, the international community must
make it clear that the resolution of Kosovo’s status will carry no precedents for
other ethnic groups or entities in the region.

5. Status with Standards: A Roadmap to Final Status
Negotiations
UNMIK’s Mandate under UN Resolution 1244
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 created a UN administration for
Kosovo and charged it with facilitating “a political process designed to determine
Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords.”2 The UN
administration was then to oversee the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s
provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement.3
2
3

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), para. 11.
Ibid.
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While the Security Council did not provide an express timetable for resolving the
question of the final status of Kosovo, it did indicate this process should be
governed by the Rambouillet Accords, which set a three-year time frame.
Importantly, Resolution 1244 in no way intended for the deployment of a UN
administration to supplant the process for a settlement of Kosovo’s final status.
Rather, 1244 is very clear in its mandate to the UN administration to facilitate the
resolution of Kosovo’s final status, to phase in Kosovo control of the mechanisms
for self-government, and then to assist in the transfer of sovereign authorities to
the new institutions created in any final settlement.4 More specifically, the
resolution requires that the UN first assume control of sovereign functions,
negotiate a constitutional framework, and then begin the transfer of sovereign
functions to Kosovo institutions. Simultaneously, the UN is mandated to pursue a
resolution of the final status of Kosovo.5
In the preamble to Resolution 1244, the UN Security Council cited the ritual
affirmation of the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the other
states of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and Annex 2 of the
Resolution.6 Crucially, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY was
conditioned by the Helsinki Final Act and Annex 2 of the Security Council
Resolution. The Helsinki Final Act provides for the equal recognition of a state’s
right to sovereignty and territorial integrity and of a minority peoples’ right to
self-determination. Annex 2 expressly places the respect for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the FRY within the context of the “interim political
framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo,”7
and it also noted the necessity of taking full account of the Rambouillet Accords.8
It is therefore within the legal mandate of UNMIK to transfer authority to the
provisional government of Kosovo.

The International Community’s Role in Kosovo since 1999
In a speech at Humboldt University in Berlin on November 12, 2002, Michael
Steiner, special representative of the secretary general (SRSG) to Kosovo,
outlined the three-stage process of the international community’s engagement in
Kosovo since 1999. The first stage involved the NATO intervention, which ended

4

Ibid.
Ibid.
6
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), Preamble.
7
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), Annex 2, para. 8.
8
Ibid. While some argue that the preamble in Resolution 1244 prevents a determination of
Kosovo’s final status, this is an inappropriate reading of 1244. The Rambouillet Accords, also in
the preamble, “recalled” the commitment of the international community to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the FRY. The accords then went on to provide for the near total exclusion of
FRY sovereignty over Kosovo and for the creation of a mechanism to determine final status in
three years. Therefore, the preamble of Resolution 1244 does not prevent the international
community from moving forward with a process for resolving Kosovo’s final status.
5
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the gross violation of human rights perpetrated by Slobodan Milosevic and ended
with the establishment of UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
The second stage commenced with the implementation of Resolution 1244
and the creation of the UN mission in Kosovo. While security continues to be
provided by NATO through the Kosovo Security Force (KFOR), UNMIK’s
mandate in the second stage is fourfold:
1. International administration;
2. Facilitation of substantial self-government;
3. Elections; and
4. Initiation of a political process to resolve Kosovo’s final status.
The central objective of this second stage is the gradual transfer of
competence and responsibility to the provisional Kosovar institutions. Steiner has
established eight goals or standards that must be met by Kosovo’s authorities as
part of this transfer of power:
1. Functioning democratic institutions;
2. Rule of law;
3. Freedom of movement;
4. Return and reintegration of all Kosovo inhabitants;
5. Development of a market economy;
6. Full property rights for all citizens;
7. Dialogue and normalized relations with Belgrade; and
8. Reduction and transformation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK) in
accordance with its mandate.
According to Steiner, “substantial progress toward these standards is also the
prerequisite for resolving the status issue.”
The third and final stage of international involvement “will be to draw Kosovo
closer to the European Union.” This will include the replacement of UNMIK with
EUMIK and is understood to be a long-term project.
The process of addressing Kosovo’s final status is thus already underway and
has begun to pick up speed as a result of the recent push by the late Serbian prime
minister to address the province’s final status. The recent call by SRSG Steiner
for talks between Belgrade and Pristina on practical and technical issues and the
agreement between UNMIK and the provisional government of Kosovo to begin
the transfer of competencies to the latter are important first steps. However, there
remain uncertainties about the evolution of this process. It is unclear, for example,
how UNMIK’s “standards before status” are to be implemented and benchmarked
and whether the Kosovars can fully meet these standards any time soon. The
achievement of standards cannot and should not be a prerequisite for the ultimate
question of Kosovo’s final status. The international community should recalibrate
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its objectives so that the consolidation of viable government institutions in
Kosovo is pursued in tandem with direct negotiations on final status.

The Roadmap to Final Status Negotiations
To that end, we believe that an approach of earned sovereignty with a clear
roadmap and timetable—that combines the pursuit of standards of governance,
continued institution building, and steps to final status negotiations—is essential.
Such a roadmap would enable politicians and the public alike to focus attention
on building functioning institutions more rapidly and effectively, rather than
being preoccupied with evading international controls and constantly having to
stress their commitment to independence. We believe the critical elements of this
roadmap are the following:

Provisional Government of Kosovo
!

A FULLY RATIONALIZED PLAN TO TRANSFER AUTHORITY TO THE
PROVISIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT. UNMIK and the office of Prime
Minister Rexhepi have already begun discussions on the transfer of
competencies in the areas of internal security, privatization, and the budget
to ministries of the provisional government. As part of this process, the
constitution should be amended to formalize the authority of the
provisional government. (See also appendix 1 of this report.) A special
council has already been established with the goal of achieving the
complete transfer of authority by the end of 2003. The transfer process
should include a program of administrative training and increased funding
(see next bullet) to support salaries and infrastructure for the ministries
and must be supported by a genuine commitment by UNMIK to a
devolution of its authority.

!

THE KOSOVO PARLIAMENT SHOULD UNDERTAKE A PROACTIVE LEGISLATIVE
PROGRAM OF RESOLUTIONS THAT ENDORSE STANDARDS AND ADVANCE THE
PROSPECTS FOR MOVING TO FINAL STATUS. It is critically important that the

provisional government of Kosovo take the necessary steps to demonstrate
its commitment to the full achievement of the standards outlined by SRSG
Steiner. To this end, the parliament should pass a package of resolutions
that, among other things, promotes reconciliation between Albanians and
Serbs in Kosovo, protects minority rights, and confirms the territorial
integrity of states in the region. Such resolutions would demonstrate to the
international community that the provisional government is prepared to
take full responsibility for establishing human rights and the rule of law in
advance of final status negotiations.
!

REFUGEE RETURN. It is imperative to allow for the reintegration of all
refugees and displaced persons who wish to return to Kosovo. Tens of
thousands of Serbs and members of other minorities, including Roma,
were displaced during the return of the Albanian refugees in the summer
of 1999. UN estimates indicate that over 230,000 Serbs who fled or were
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forced out of their homes when NATO intervened in Kosovo are currently
registered as displaced persons in neighboring republics. To discern those
with genuine claims, all returnees would be required to prepare a form that
would provide data on their background and claims. The safe return of
Serbs and other minorities should be ensured, as well as efforts to create
opportunities for their sustainable return, such as jobs, education, and a
secure environment in which to live.
!

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A JOINT KOSOVAR POLITICAL PLATFORM. Kosovo’s
political leaders must establish a joint political platform to ensure that the
provisional government speaks with one voice in final status negotiations
as soon as possible. (See appendix 2 for analysis of the need for Kosovar
unity.)

Kosovo, Serbia, and Macedonia
!

DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRISTINA AND BELGRADE. UNMIK has proposed that
a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade be established to build
confidence and cooperation on both sides. The dialogue is expected to
cover technical and practical issues. We believe that the dialogue would be
best achieved if it were held in a venue outside the region, as it would
force both parties to make a commitment to progress in discussions. A
frequent refrain of various reports outlining options for a final settlement
is that a wide range of outstanding practical issues could and should be
resolved through pre-status negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina.
Though we generally concur with this view, we are also aware that both
sides must be clear from the outset about the nature and scope of such
discussions. We believe that talks on territorial, political, military,
economic, and humanitarian issues should be restricted to laying the
groundwork for final status negotiations and that initial discussions should
focus instead on confidence-building measures that include:
Scientific and educational exchanges and NGO cooperation;
Coordinated efforts against organized crime and trafficking and mutual
assistance in tracing missing persons; and
Cooperation in tracing and locating missing persons from Kosovo through
the establishment of a bilateral working group to conduct the work.

!

DIALOGUE BETWEEN PRISTINA AND SKOPJE. Direct discussions should
begin as early as possible between the provisional government of Kosovo
and Macedonia to allay mutual suspicions and prejudices, to promote
economic cooperation, to initiate educational and scientific exchanges, and
to create the basis for a final agreement between an independent Kosovo
and Macedonia. A key goal of this process would be the formal
renunciation by the Kosovar Albanians of any territorial ambitions beyond
the current boundaries of Kosovo. These discussions should begin in April
and be completed before the end of 2003.
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Kosovo and the EU
!

INCREASED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR KOSOVO. The EU should
actively promote Kosovo’s structural reform and economic development,
as well as cohesion within Europe, by increasing its earmarked assistance
to Kosovo in 2003 and 2004 under the Community Assistance for
Reconstruction, Development, and Stabilization (CARDS) program and
by maintaining or increasing the level of aid in 2005–2006. Moreover, this
assistance should be conditioned on direct participation of the Kosovo
government in setting priorities and selecting projects linked to this aid,
and it should be distinct from that provided to Serbia and Montenegro.
The parameters of this new assistance program should be worked out at
the EU summit in Zagreb scheduled for June 2003.

The United States and the European Union
!

U.S. AND EU COMMITMENT TO INDEPENDENCE FOR KOSOVO. The cover
afforded to the international community over Kosovo’s final status by
Resolution 1244 is fast ending. To that end, it is essential that the United
States and EU offer a clear and unequivocal policy of independence for
Kosovo by no later than the early fall of 2003.

!

U.S. AND EU COMMITMENT TO AN INDEPENDENT SERBIA. The key to the
resolution of Kosovo’s final status lies in convincing Serbia that it is in its
best interests to accept Kosovo’s independence. This can be best achieved
through U.S.-EU support for a Serbia independent of Kosovo and
Montenegro. This could be achieved through a package of incentives and
commitments to Serbia in return for its agreement to relinquish its claims
to sovereignty over Kosovo. This package could include the following:
Guarantees of protection of the human rights of Kosovo Serbs;
Guarantees of protection for all Serb religious and cultural monuments in
Kosovo;
Increased development aid to Serbia through the CARDS program;
Political support for its entry into the EU and NATO; and
Substantial and sustained technical, financial, and intelligence support in
combating organized crime networks.

6. Final Status Negotiations
Final status negotiations should commence early in 2004. The goals of the
negotiations should be clear from the outset. A comprehensive and detailed final
status settlement plan should be prepared in advance as a basis for negotiations. It
should comprise the components listed below.
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Elements of a Final Status Settlement
Bilateral Goals in Relations between Kosovo and Serbia
! Kosovo will be independent with borders based on those of the former
province;
!

Kosovo will have sovereignty over Mitrovica, but the latter will be
administered under a special regime of the UN or EU charged with
undertaking a Brcko-style model designed to reintegrate the city into
Kosovo through a process of municipalization;

!

Kosovo will be permitted a small multiethnic national protection force that
remains under the control of a continuing NATO presence to monitor the
implementation of the final status agreement, ensure stability, and provide
protection for all citizens;

!

Constitutional guarantees for minorities, including options for flexible
EU-style dual citizenship arrangements;

!

A non-visa regime/Schengen-style agreement on freedom of movement
between Kosovo and Serbia;

!

Trade and commercial agreements: In addition to agreements on tariffs,
currency, taxes, and investments in building modern highways and rail
links between Belgrade and Pristina, this would include investments that
can be initiated in border areas between Serbia and Kosovo in order to
improve local infrastructure and encourage trade and the free movement of
people;

!

Cultural agreements on protecting churches and monuments: Cultural
agreements should be initiated to afford protection and ease of access for
Serbs to cultural monuments such as Orthodox churches, monasteries,
shrines, and other landmarks inside Kosovo. Such a display of goodwill
and accommodation by the authorities in Pristina would help engender
mutual trust and tolerance.

Multilateral Goals among Kosovo, Serbia, UN, NATO, and the EU
! An agreement to replace UNMIK with a new EU administrative authority
to work in collaboration with the Kosovo authorities to continue the
process of building self-governing institutions and to prepare Kosovo for
eventual integration into the EU. The resolution will also call for a
continued NATO or EU security presence;
!

General agreement among all parties that the final status agreement will
not negatively impact the territorial integrity of any other state in the
Balkans.

Multilateral Goals among Kosovo, Serbia, and the EU
! Kosovo and Serbia will be separately guaranteed increased assistance
under the CARDS program;
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An EU commitment to Kosovo’s accession to the European Union that
will be decoupled from any projected accession of Serbia and
Montenegro.

Modalities
Ground Rules
The framework for final status negotiations cannot be a repeat of the Rambouillet
agreement of 1999. It should be clear from the outset that the negotiations will
result in an agreement that provides for the independence of Kosovo, the details
of which will be worked out in the course of the negotiations. A final agreement
document should be prepared in advance for discussion. Negotiations should be
led by a working group comprising the United States, the EU, and the UN and
should be directed by two representatives—one from the United States and one
from the European Union. Because the final agreement will address the new
country’s borders, it will be necessary to have representatives from Macedonia,
and potentially Albania, in addition to the UN and NATO, all of whom will be
signatories to the final agreement. Finally, it should be understood that the
negotiations are not between Kosovo and Serbia, but an international process that
will define the nature and structure of Kosovo’s sovereignty as an independent
state.
Venue
The parties to the negotiations will need to be confident that the venue is
beneficial to all sides. This immediately rules out Pristina or Belgrade or any site
in Southeastern Europe. As both Kosovo and Serbia seek to become EU members,
it makes good sense for the negotiations to be held at a European site such as
Brussels. However, consideration should also be given to holding the negotiations
in the United States, as there are a number of advantages to U.S.-based talks.
!

Although Kosovo and Serbia will eventually be part of the EU, there
remains considerable uncertainty over the process of their accession. This
could prove to be a distraction if talks were held in Europe.

!

Holding negotiations in the United States would also increase the chances
of reaching a final agreement, as the distance to Europe would deter the
parties from taking unwarranted recesses and temporary adjournments as
part of their negotiating tactics.

!

U.S.-based talks are also less likely to be influenced by media interference
and exploitation.

!

U.S.-based talks will also serve as an incentive to keep the U.S.
government engaged in Kosovo both before and after the final settlement.

Format
The venue options outlined above call for a Dayton-style framework, in which
intensive negotiations are conducted over a fixed period, and with the clear sense
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from the commencement of negotiations that a final agreement will be reached.
The United States and the EU should be in control of the negotiations from the
outset. Unlike Dayton, all negotiations should be conducted directly among all the
parties.
Post-agreement Process
The final agreement should be approved by the UN Security Council and
followed by a donor conference to revitalize assistance to Kosovo. At this point,
UNMIK should be immediately replaced by a joint UN-EU representative.

Provisional Timetable for Final Status
April 2003:

Kosovo-Serbia dialogue commences

May 2003:

Statehood Action Plan (SAP)

June 2003:

Dialogue between Pristina and Skopje

July 2003:

New development assistance plan worked out

Fall 2003:

United States and EU call for an independent Kosovo

Early 2004:

Final status negotiations begin

June 2004:

Final status settlement agreement drafted

July 2005:

Final status settlement agreement confirmed by UN Security
Council

June 2005:

Kosovo statehood declared

Janusz Bugajski, R. Bruce Hitchner, Paul Williams

15

Appendix 1: UNSC 1244 Not a Barrier to Resolution of Final
Status
Despite the clarity of Resolution 1244 regarding the interim transfer of
sovereignty to the UN administration and the legitimacy of a process for
determining the final status, some European states have argued that Resolution
1244, by its preambular reference to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
FRY, precludes an eventual independent final status for Kosovo. This argument,
however, does not rest on a sufficient legal foundation.
The international civil presence in Kosovo, which would take the form of an
SRSG and accompanying staff, was authorized to provide an interim civil
administration for Kosovo.9 The Security Council then made it clear, however,
that the UN administration was only an interim entity and that, pending settlement
of the final status of Kosovo, its primary task was to promote the establishment of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, based on the Ahtisaari
Agreement and the Rambouillet Accords.10 To accomplish this objective the UN
civil administration was charged with “organizing and overseeing the
development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous selfgovernment pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections.”11
As discussed below, a key element in this process was the adoption by the UN
administration of a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government.
The Security Council also made it clear in its reaffirmation and restatement of the
Ahtisaari Agreement that the “negotiations between the parties for a settlement
should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing
institutions.”12 Once the Kosovo institutions were created, the UN administration
was to transfer to these institutions its administrative responsibilities while
overseeing and supporting the consolidation of these provisional institutions, as
well as other peace-building activities.13
Most importantly, the interim UN administration was also charged by the
Security Council with the obligation to facilitate “a political process designed to
determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet
Accords.”14 The UN administration was then to oversee the transfer of authority
9

The mandate of the UN administration included the authority to: perform basic civilian
administrative functions; support the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic
reconstruction; support, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations,
humanitarian and disaster relief aid; maintain civil law and order, including establishing local
police forces, and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in
Kosovo, protect and promote human rights; and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all
refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo. See United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1244 (1999), para. 11.
10
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), para. 10a.
11
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), para. 11.
12
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), Annex 2, para. 8.
13
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), para. 11.
14
Ibid.
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from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to new institutions established under a
political settlement.15 Although the Security Council did not provide an express
timetable for resolving the question of the final status of Kosovo, it did indicate
that this process should be governed by the Rambouillet Accords, which set a
three-year time frame (which expired last year).
Importantly, Resolution 1244 in no way intends for the deployment of a UN
administration to supplant the process for a settlement of Kosovo’s final status.
Rather, 1244 is very clear in its mandate to the UN administration to facilitate the
resolution of Kosovo’s final status, to phase in Kosovo control of the mechanisms
for self-government, and then to assist in the transfer of sovereign authorities to
the new institutions created in any final settlement.16 More specifically, the
resolution requires that the UN first assume control of sovereign functions,
negotiate a constitutional framework, and then begin the transfer of sovereign
functions to Kosovo institutions. Simultaneously, the UN is mandated to pursue a
resolution of the final status of Kosovo.17
In the preamble to Resolution 1244, the UN Security Council cited the ritual
affirmation of the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the FRY and the other states of the region, as set out in the
Helsinki Final Act and annex 2, of the resolution.18 Crucially, the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the FRY was conditioned by the Helsinki Final Act and
annex 2 of the Security Council Resolution. The Helsinki Final Act provides for
the equal recognition of a state’s right to sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
of a minority peoples’ right to self-determination. Annex 2 expressly places the
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY within the context
of the “interim political framework agreement providing for substantial selfgovernment for Kosovo,”19 and also noted the necessity of taking full account of
the Rambouillet Accords.20
The Rambouillet Accords, also in the preamble, “recalled” the commitment of
the international community to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
FRY.21 The accords, as noted above, then went on to provide for the near total
exclusion of FRY sovereignty over Kosovo and for the creation of a mechanism
to determine final status in three years. Therefore, the preamble of Resolution
1244 does not prevent the international community from moving forward with a
process for resolving Kosovo’s final status.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), Preamble.
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), Annex 2, para. 8.
20
Ibid.
21
Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet, February 23,
1999), Preamble.
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Appendix 2: The Need for Kosovar Unity
For Kosovo, and the overwhelming majority of its people, an independent state
recognized by the international community is the issue that eclipses all others.
Only such a state will be capable of voluntarily integrating into NATO, the EU,
and other international institutions. But the achievement of these goals requires a
strategy and a vision. The Kosovars cannot simply rely on international actors to
deliver statehood on a silver plate. A major task for Kosovo’s political and civic
leaders is to devise cogent, convincing, and positive arguments that independence
is the most compelling option, as outlined in this paper. Moreover, these
arguments will need to be convincingly presented to the key international players,
especially to those in Washington and Brussels. Two simultaneous strategies to
help forge national unity can be adopted by leaders of the aspiring state.
1. CONTRACT FOR INDEPENDENCE. Although a broad spectrum of political
parties has emerged in Kosovo, they have little programmatic and policy
distinctiveness since they all remain primarily focused on the issue of
independence. The denial of status resolution by international players
discourages healthy political competition in Pristina and beams all
pronouncements and policies through the prism of national independence.
Paradoxically, the denial of statehood discussions and decisions simply
freezes political developments and stifles debate, as no party or political
leader wants to be outmaneuvered in their overriding support for
independence.
In such unfavorable conditions, Kosovar politicians need to forge a
multiparty agreement or contract for a roadmap toward independence and
statehood, as there is near national consensus for independence. Such
unity on the primary national question would then enable political debate
and vibrant competition with regard to domestic policy issues that would
evolve. The dialogue on the criteria and timetable for independence,
determined in negotiations with the international community, would itself
have a positive impact on the domestic reform process.
2. PROMOTING A KOSOVAR IDENTITY. To strengthen the sense of unity and
purpose, political leaders and opinion shapers in Pristina will also need to
define and promote a distinct Kosovar identity. The sense of community
was strengthened during the existence of Yugoslavia, particularly as a
result of the racism and brutality of the Milosevic regime; with
independence, a unified sense of community could then be promoted on
the basis of a national identity. There are at least three possible definitions
of Kosovars: as one subdivision of the Albanian nation; as a separate and
emerging nation; or as a territory-wide identity regardless of ethnicity.
There are clear advantages and disadvantages associated with each
category and they need to be publicly and openly discussed.
The first option is to define Kosovars as simply a part of the allencompassing Albanian nationality. Such an approach will obviously
strengthen the sense of solidarity, unity, and cohesion. It would provide
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historical continuity and a feeling of purpose and destiny. The notion of
joint nationhood gives significant support and protection for the bulk of
the population in the context of political uncertainty and international
turmoil.
On the negative side, Kosovarism as essentially or exclusively
Albanianism could be perceived as a major threat by neighboring groups
whatever the reality of popular aspirations. It can be viewed as an
encouragement for expansionism and the goal of a “Greater” or an “Ethnic
Albania.” It may also threaten minority groups within Kosovo and those
who wish to return. This characterization may therefore promote tension
and conflict, as the Kosovars will stand accused of seeking absorption into
a larger Albanian state once they attain national independence.
In the second definition of identity, the Kosovars can be transformed into
a separate nationality in a prolonged process of ethnogenesis. This can
also provide a focus for political unity, territorial stability, and national
development. It can also encourage coherence in dealing not only with
neighboring Slavic populations but also with Tirana, other foreign
governments, and international institutions.
On the negative side, Kosovar distinctiveness may be seen as undermining
Albanian unity, as well as creating potential competition and conflict
points with Albania itself. Moreover, by shifting attention to ethnically
defined nation building, such a definition may alienate the country’s
national and religious minorities who will view themselves as outsiders in
the emerging Kosovo state.
In the third instance, employing a definition of Kosovar that embraces a
state territorial identity and civic-based citizenship regardless of ethnicity
can also contribute to building cohesiveness. As an inclusive category, it
will help reassure all the minority groups that they belong to the
embryonic state entity. It will also contribute to undermining any
accusations that Kosovo presents an Albanian expansionist threat to the
entire Balkan region. This may also ease Belgrade’s concerns of having a
threatening population of Albanian or Kosovar nationalists on its borders.
The disadvantages of a territory-based and distinct state identification
must also be considered by analysts and public leaders. It could dilute the
Kosovar’s Albanian identity, foster disputes with other Albanian
communities, and even draw both Serbia and Albania into the fray in
competition over the Kosovar population and its territory. However, if
handled astutely and inclusively, the promotion of a civic-based identity is
likely to lessen domestic conflicts and increase international cooperation.
Kosovo’s intellectuals, political leaders, and opinion makers need to agree
which identity would most effectively consolidate the drive for
independence and which identity would stifle and distract those
aspirations as the territory gradually develops its political institutions.
Identity remains a strong bonding agent and the major source of self-
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respect in a fast-changing world. Rather than eradicating the popular
yearning for local and group identities, the process of Europeanization and
globalization may actually reinforce them. Individuals do not want their
cultures and traditions submerged and they generally oppose uniformity
and standardization. For Kosovo, however, identity is not just a question
of uniqueness but of political subjectivity and national existence.

